The reopening of the Colombia-Venezuela border in 2022 has not curtailed smuggling activities, as criminal networks continue to exploit illegal routes for trade. The persistence of these operations is attributed to corruption, distrust in authorities, and economic factors. Armed groups complicate the situation further by increasing extortion efforts against local businesses, leading to an uptick in violence in Cúcuta.
As night descends on Cúcuta, Colombia’s vital border hub, criminal organizations exploit the cover of darkness to facilitate illegal operations. Established dirt paths, referred to as “trochas,” become essential conduits for smuggling activities, allowing goods to traverse between Colombia and Venezuela while evading law enforcement oversight. A local business leader remarked, “While we sleep, countless things happen in the city. And yes, smuggling is one of them,” highlighting the ongoing struggles against illicit trade within the region. After the Colombia-Venezuela border was abruptly closed in February 2019 by President Nicolás Maduro due to humanitarian aid tensions, smuggling intensified through these trochas, which soon transformed into crucial routes for both illegal goods and migrant trafficking. The advent of the COVID-19 pandemic further entrenched these illicit economies, negatively impacting local communities. The official reopening of the border on September 26, 2022, was initially met with optimism regarding the normalization of trade and the potential closure of smuggling avenues. Nevertheless, criminal organizations have continued to flourish, adapting their methods to maintain their operations. To recover lost revenues, these groups have intensified their extortion campaigns, increasingly preying on local communities and businesses. Transport vehicles now utilize the Simón Bolívar and Atanasio Girardot bridges, linking the regions of Norte de Santander in Colombia and Táchira in Venezuela. These legal routes primarily cater to commercial shipments destined for Venezuela, but the prevalence of smuggling persists, with individuals relying on foot, motorcycles, and vehicles to navigate the clandestine tracks. Corruption and a profound distrust of Venezuelan authorities deter many from utilizing official crossings. Ronal Rodríguez of Universidad del Rosario noted, “With the trochas, there’s just one payment, and the cargo is secure,” emphasizing the allure of illicit routes. Significant challenges such as arbitrary checkpoint fees on the Venezuelan side and financial complexities arising from sanctions further inhibit the revival of cross-border commerce. Local smuggling continues to thrive as vendors transport goods like food from Colombia, capitalizing on the stark price differences between the two nations. For instance, a liter of milk costing $0.90 in Colombia can sell for nearly double that amount in Venezuela. Such disparities provide economic incentives for illegal trade, often at the expense of quality and consumer health. Control of the smuggling pathways along the Colombia-Venezuela border has recently shifted, with armed groups such as the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional – ELN) and Venezuela’s Tren de Aragua gang exerting influence over these areas. Following the border’s reopening, however, the dynamics of organized crime have become increasingly complex, exacerbating tensions in Cúcuta. During the closure period, these trochas had served as pivotal revenue sources for armed factions, collecting fees from individuals and goods utilizing the routes. With the reopening, the smuggling volume has seen a decrease, prompting conflict among groups vying for territory and control over local businesses. The ELN has adapted with relative ease, preserving its financial streams through extortion and drug trafficking. In contrast, Tren de Aragua faces challenges as it had heavily depended on extorting small traders. Consequently, this group has redirected its focus toward local enterprises in Cúcuta, leading to an alarming uptick in violence and threats against businesses seeking financial protection. The intensifying competition for dominance in illegal operations has resulted in a notable rise in violent incidents, including grenade attacks within the city.
The Colombia-Venezuela border has long been a focal point of illicit activity, particularly smuggling, which intensified following the border closure in 2019. This closure escalated criminal enterprises’ reliance on the trochas for movement between the two nations, further complicated by the COVID-19 pandemic’s impact on economies. The recent reopening of the border in 2022 was seen as an opportunity for legitimate trade restoration, but deep-rooted corruption, endemic distrust of authorities, and the presence of armed groups have made it difficult to quell the smuggling operations that emerged during the closure.
In summary, the smuggling networks along the Colombia-Venezuela border have demonstrated remarkable resilience despite the official reopening of the border. Criminal organizations have adapted by intensifying extortion efforts aimed at local businesses and residents, making economic normalization extremely challenging. Continued reliance on illegal routes fueled by distrust and economic disparity hampers the prospects for legitimate trade and exacerbates the existing cycle of violence and crime in Cúcuta.
Original Source: insightcrime.org
