General Abebe Teklehaymanot, known as Jobe, predicts a likely conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia due to deteriorating relations and military mobilizations. He cites strategic interests in the Assab port and regime change motivations concerning the PFDJ, while also warning of potential interventions by external powers. Jobe reflects on historical grievances, expressing regret over past decisions that allowed Eritrea’s military capabilities to grow amid prolonged tensions.
Recent insights from military analysts highlight a growing likelihood of conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia, following a significant deterioration in their previously amicable relationship. Politicians and military leaders are raising alarms about the potential for war, particularly after the once warm rapport between Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki and Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has soured within less than three years—a situation made even more concerning as military mobilizations escalate on both sides.
General Abebe Teklehaymanot, also known as Jobe, a former commander of the Ethiopian Defense Force, articulated perspectives on this emerging conflict in a Tigrigna-language interview. He indicated that “the two countries are likely heading to war,” citing several indicators of looming military action. This sentiment is intensified by mutual accusations of war mongering and the visible military preparations that both nations have undertaken.
Jobe elaborated on two primary motivations that could spur an armed conflict. First, there is the strategic interest in Assab, a port vital to Ethiopia that remains under Eritrean control. The loss of access to this port has often been attributed to the negligence of the late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, leading some to consider it a treasonous act.
The second motivation revolves around the aspiration to dismantle the People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ), led by Afwerki. This aligns with a regime change narrative, previously believed to have U.S. backing. However, such support appeared to wane under the Trump administration, leaving uncertainties about future U.S. policy.
Moreover, Jobe suggested that third-party state actors, such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United States, might engage in the conflict for their own strategic interests. Reflecting on past conflicts, Jobe expressed regret about failing to neutralize the PFDJ during the 1998-2000 war, emphasizing, “We had the military capacity to do so.”
Historical context reveals that disagreements within the TPLF-led government during that time led to significant rifts, with different factions proposing divergent approaches to Eritrea. The ultimately victorious faction, led by Meles, prioritized avoiding sanctions but faced criticism and implications of submissiveness from rival factions.
Jobe reiterated concerns about allowing Eritrea to rebuild its military after 2000, which has contributed to the ongoing tensions. The period of “no peace, no war” persisted until normalized relations were attempted in 2018, but these efforts faltered quickly, returning both nations to a state of hostility. Like many current TPLF leaders, Jobe warned that Tigray could become the epicenter of conflict if war between Ethiopia and Eritrea ensues.
In summary, the prospects of a renewed conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia seem increasingly plausible, as articulated by General Jobe and observed through military mobilizations by both countries. Motivations for potential conflict include strategic interests in Assab and a regime change ambition regarding the PFDJ. Furthermore, the involvement of external actors could exacerbate the situation. The historical context underscores failed opportunities for resolution and raises concerns about the implications for Tigray should hostilities reignite.
Original Source: borkena.com
