This article explores competing proposals for postwar governance in Gaza from U.S. President Donald Trump, Israeli opposition leader Yair Lapid, and Egypt. Each plan presents significant challenges and criticisms, particularly surrounding issues of Palestinian displacement and governance authority. The ongoing conflict complicates these proposals, highlighting the fragile ceasefire and the major obstacles that must be overcome for effective governance post-war.
In the wake of the ongoing conflict in Gaza, a significant question arises regarding the governance and reconstruction of the region post-war. This issue is pivotal for achieving a lasting ceasefire and long-term peace. Without a satisfactory governance plan for all parties involved, it is implausible to expect a genuine commitment from either Israel or Hamas to halt further hostilities.
There are three primary proposals for governance in Gaza after the war. The plans presented by U.S. President Donald Trump, Israeli opposition leader Yair Lapid, and the Egyptian government highlight different approaches, each accompanied by various challenges. Following a ceasefire initiated in January, these proposals emerged in response to the need for a structured plan.
President Trump’s proposal suggests the permanent removal of Palestinians from Gaza, relocating them to Jordan and Egypt, where they would reside in newly established communities. The U.S. would take charge of rebuilding Gaza, turning it into a luxurious destination. However, this plan has faced universal condemnation, with critics deeming it an endorsement of ethnic cleansing and in violation of international law, as it undermines Palestinian statehood ambitions.
Mr. Lapid’s plan, referred to as the “Egyptian solution,” would see Egypt manage Gaza’s civilian and security affairs for a period of eight to fifteen years. This plan aims to demilitarize Gaza while preparing for eventual self-governance, with additional support from the international community. Notably, it does not propose the permanent removal of Gaza’s residents. However, Mr. Lapid failed to consult with Egypt prior to presenting his plan, and it was subsequently rejected by Egyptian authorities.
Conversely, Egypt proposed a comprehensive $53 billion plan to rehabilitate and rebuild Gaza over five years. This multifaceted approach encompasses various phases, from debris cleanup to large-scale construction projects. Importantly, Hamas would relinquish control to a temporary governing committee composed of independent technocrats, facilitating a transition towards a more stable governance framework. However, this plan lacks the necessary backing from the Trump administration and Israel, primarily due to its failure to mandate the disarmament of Hamas.
Collectively, all three proposals face significant hurdles under the current tenuous ceasefire. As hostilities continue, the likelihood of establishing credible governance diminishes. Israeli authorities are currently pressuring Hamas while blocking aid, exacerbating tensions further. Any sustainable plan must begin with a cessation of conflict, yet the existing ceasefire remains precarious and lacks long-term viability.
Moreover, the retention of power by Hamas in Gaza continues to obstruct potential reconstruction efforts. The Israeli and U.S. administrations oppose Hamas’s authority, complicating the path toward peace and rebuilding. In light of these challenges, the situation remains fluid, with the future governance of Gaza yet to be determined; the prospect of reaching a stable resolution appears uncertain and fraught with difficulties.
In conclusion, the governance of Gaza post-war is a complex issue involving vastly divergent proposals from Trump, Lapid, and Egypt. Each plan encounters substantial criticism and logistical hurdles, all exacerbated by a fragile ceasefire. The future governance of Gaza will depend heavily on achieving a meaningful ceasefire, addressing the power dynamics with Hamas, and garnering international support to facilitate reconstruction and stability in the region.
Original Source: foreignpolicy.com
