Iranian proxies, including the Fatemiyoun and Zainebiyoun Brigades, have faced significant challenges amid recent anti-Assad offensive actions in Syria. Originally mobilized by Iran to support the Assad regime during the civil war, many fighters have abandoned their posts as the conflict evolves. Experts suggest that despite this, Iran is unlikely to disband these groups, needing to adapt their deployment in light of changing regional dynamics.
The fate of Iranian proxies in Syria, particularly the Fatemiyoun Brigade composed of Afghan Shiites and the Zainebiyoun Brigade made up of Pakistani fighters, has been precarious amidst recent escalations in the Syrian civil war. These groups formed part of Iran’s broader strategy, known as the “Axis of Resistance,” aimed at bolstering the Assad regime. During the civil war’s peak, they played pivotal roles in battles against the Islamic State, but as the regime faced new threats from anti-Assad rebels, many of these fighters fled their posts, leaving behind empty bases.
Historically, the Fatemiyoun and Zainebiyoun were established in response to the Sunni extremist group IS, emerging early in the conflict when the regime’s survival was at stake. The Fatemiyoun, initially starting with a handful of volunteers, received significant support and strategic direction from Iranian military leaders, evolving into a formidable force estimated at 5,000 to 10,000 fighters. The Zainebiyoun, half that size, faced similar recruitment challenges and military tasks, ultimately operating across various regions of Syria.
However, with recent anti-Assad offensives, many members of these militias abandoned their positions, leading to a significant decline in their operational effectiveness. Observations reveal that bases were left unguarded, causing uncertainty regarding the future of these groups. Experts contend that Iran, in light of challenges faced by allies such as Hamas and Hezbollah, is likely to retain and possibly modify these militias rather than disband them. The IRGC’s recruiting strategies included offering incentives to Afghan refugees and coercing others into service, further emphasizing Iran’s commitment to maintaining its influence in the region.
The eventual whereabouts of these proxies remain unclear, with suggestions that some fled to Iran or neighboring Iraq, while others might still linger in Syria, awaiting possible re-deployment or evacuation. The continuing volatility in the region means that Iran’s strategy for maintaining its proxy networks will likely evolve in response to emerging threats.
As the situation develops, indications point toward a crucial phase in Iran’s regional influence strategy, heavily reliant on maintaining these proxy groups. Therefore, understanding the implications of these dynamics is essential for deciphering the complexities of Middle Eastern geopolitics and Iran’s foreign policy agenda.
The Iranian proxies in Syria, particularly the Fatemiyoun and Zainebiyoun Brigades, were developed as part of Iran’s strategic response to the Syrian civil war, significantly impacted by the rise of the Islamic State. The Fatemiyoun Brigade comprised Afghan Shiite fighters, while the Zainebiyoun Brigade was formed from Pakistani Shiites, with both groups receiving support from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Their involvement in Syria has been heavily characterized by military engagements aimed at defending the Assad regime and protecting Shiite interests.
In summary, the future of Iranian proxy groups like the Fatemiyoun and Zainebiyoun in Syria is uncertain following recent military setbacks and the retreat of many fighters. While their operational capacities have diminished due to the changing dynamics of conflict, experts believe that Iran will retain these groups, adapting their structure and influence in response to the ongoing security challenges in the region. The ongoing conflict further complicates Iran’s strategy, necessitating a reevaluation of its reliance on these military factions as key allies in maintaining stability and pursuing its geopolitical objectives.
Original Source: www.voanews.com
