The M23 rebel group has captured key cities in the DRC, raising concerns about the FARDC’s capability. Despite increased military spending, systemic corruption and operational deficiencies have undermined the army’s effectiveness. With the support of Rwanda, M23 poses a persistent challenge, complicating the DRC’s efforts to implement military reforms and counterinsurgency strategies.
In recent months, the M23 rebel movement has successfully seized the prominent cities of Goma and Bukavu in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), establishing long-term governance in the territories under its control. The Congolese armed forces, known as the FARDC, consisted of approximately 135,000 soldiers in 2022, according to estimates from the International Institute for Strategic Studies, with indications of an increase in recent months. In contrast, the M23’s estimated strength is merely a few thousand fighters, augmented by roughly 4,000 soldiers from Rwanda.
A significant factor contributing to the FARDC’s struggles is systemic corruption. Congolese President Felix Tshisekedi has raised military spending to $794 million, raising concerns regarding how M23 successfully seized control of vital regions in eastern DRC. According to Alain De Neve from the Royal Higher Institute for Defence, corruption has resulted in the misappropriation of funds meant for personnel salaries and military logistics, which critically undermines troop morale and leads to desertions among soldiers.
Furthermore, the FARDC has increasingly operated as a “self-service shop,” mainly benefiting military leaders’ personal enrichment, as articulated by Ciaran Wrons-Passmann of the German Ecumenical Network for Central Africa. Reports indicate that military commanders in eastern DRC often exaggerate troop numbers to secure additional funding from Kinshasa, with the funds predominantly allocated through higher-ranking generals.
Challenges faced by the FARDC extend beyond fiscal issues to operational deficiencies, characterized by inadequate training, equipment, and communication protocols. The FARDC has been labeled as an inefficient military force burdened by entrenched problems, including poor remuneration and rampant corruption, which thwart reform initiatives. Although improvements in soldier pay have been suggested, these amounts still fall short compared to the compensation provided to Eastern European mercenaries.
Structural issues within the FARDC also stem from a lack of competent military leadership, where promotion often correlates with loyalty to the regime rather than military acumen. This has perpetuated a cycle of poor tactical decisions and an unstable command structure, as evidenced by frequent leadership changes in critical positions.
The legacy of division within the DRC’s military can be traced back to President Mobutu Sese Seko’s era, during which the army was deliberately kept weak to mitigate the risk of coups. This historical context contributes to the current reluctance of the DRC government to negotiate with M23, given concerns over infiltration by foreign military influences, particularly from Rwanda. The current dynamics between Rwanda and the DRC underscore the complexity of the ongoing conflict.
The support provided by Rwanda’s military remains a critical factor in the FARDC’s difficulties in effectively countering M23. With the DRC actively undertaking military reforms, officials acknowledge that these transformations will require considerable time to implement adequately, illustrating the depth of the challenges faced by the national military.
The Democratic Republic of Congo’s army, the FARDC, faces significant obstacles that hinder its ability to combat the M23 rebel movement effectively. Rooted in systemic corruption, inadequate funding and training, as well as a legacy of political manipulation, the FARDC struggles against a better-organized M23 supported by Rwanda. As the Congolese government seeks to reform its military, challenges remain high in overcoming entrenched issues and forming a capable armed force.
Original Source: www.dw.com
